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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-2519 
___________ 
 
MANUEL LAMPON-PAZ, 
          Appellant 
 
v. 
 
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-16-cv-08650) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kevin McNulty 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 20, 2018 
Before:  JORDAN, RESTREPO and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed April 30, 2018) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Manuel Lampon-Paz appeals from the order of the District Court dismissing his  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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complaint with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  We will affirm. 
I. 
 Lampon-Paz is a former federal employee who is receiving federal disability 
retirement annuity payments.  At issue here is the second of two lawsuits regarding those 
payments that he filed against the Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”).  In his first 
suit, he claimed that the OPM improperly offset his monthly payments in 2014 for Social 
Security benefits that he had stopped receiving.  He also claimed that the OPM 
improperly withheld his July 2015 payment.  He did not dispute that the OPM, as it 
argued, ultimately recalculated his payments and retroactively paid him everything he 
was due.  Instead, he alleged in conclusory fashion that the OPM was negligent in failing 
to pay the proper amounts sooner.  He sought compensatory damages allegedly resulting 
from the delay.  The District Court construed his complaint as arising in relevant part 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) and dismissed it without prejudice because 
he did not exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit. 
 Five days later, Lampon-Paz filed the complaint at issue here raising the same 
claims and also claiming to have exhausted his administrative remedies for FTCA 
purposes while his prior suit was pending.  The OPM filed a motion to dismiss his 
complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that his 
claim for negligence under the FTCA was preempted by the Civil Service Reform Act 
(“CSRA”) which, inter alia, amended and supplemented the Civil Service Retirement Act 
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(the “Retirement Act”).  The District Court agreed and dismissed Lampon-Paz’s 
complaint on that basis.  Lampon-Paz appeals.1 
II. 
 We will affirm.  The CSRA and Retirement Act are part of the “overlapping 
statutory schemes that specify the benefits to which federal employees . . . are entitled, 
and provide a reticulated remedial regime for beneficiaries to secure review—including 
judicial review—of benefit determinations.”  Rodriguez v. United States, 852 F.3d 67, 83 
(1st Cir. 2017) (quotation marks omitted); see also Lindahl v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 470 
U.S. 768, 771-75 (1985) (describing interaction of the CSRA, the Retirement Act, and the 
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982).  For ease of discussion only, we will refer to 
the relevant portions of these overlapping schemes as the CSRA. 
The CSRA requires the OPM to administer its provisions, adjudicate claims for 
benefits, and pay all payable claims.  See 5 U.S.C. §§ 8347(a), 8461(a), (c).  A 
beneficiary unhappy with the OPM’s determination of benefits may seek review by the 
Merits Systems Protection Board.  See 5 U.S.C. §§ 8347(d)(1), 8461(e)(1).  And a 
beneficiary unhappy with the Board’s decision may then seek judicial review, but only in  
                                              
1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of facial challenges to the 
District Court’s jurisdiction is plenary.  See Treasurer of N.J. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 
684 F.3d 382, 395 (3d Cir. 2012).  The OPM also argued below that dismissal was 
warranted because the United States itself is the only proper defendant on an FTCA 
claim.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(a), (b)(1).  The District Court did not dismiss Lampon-
Paz’s complaint on that basis and instead noted that it might have permitted him to name 
the United States if his FTCA claim were otherwise valid. 
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A).   
 Both the Supreme Court and this Court have held that the CSRA’s specific and 
detailed statutory scheme divests courts of jurisdiction to award certain supplemental 
remedies.  See, e.g., United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453-54 (1988) (holding that 
employees who were covered by the CSRA but did not have a remedy thereunder could 
not seek relief under the Back Pay Act); Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 795 
(3d Cir. 2003) (declining to imply a cause of action for tort damages arising from federal 
employment because “the CSRA . . . provides the full scheme of remedies available”). 
 For the same reason, other courts have held that the CSRA precludes supplemental 
remedies under the FTCA in particular.  See, e.g., Mahtesian v. Lee, 406 F.3d 1131, 1134 
(9th Cir. 2005); Am. Postal Workers Union v. U.S. Postal Serv., 940 F.2d 704, 708 (D.C. 
Cir. 1991); Rollins v. Marsh, 937 F.2d 134, 139 (5th Cir. 1991); Premachandra v. United 
States, 739 F.2d 392, 394 (8th Cir. 1984).  These cases arose in the federal employment 
context, which the CSRA also governs, but courts have recognized that the framework 
prohibiting supplemental remedies in that context applies equally in the context of 
retirement benefits as well.  See Rodriguez, 852 F.3d at 82-83; Lacson v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., 726 F.3d 170, 174 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2013).   
For example, one court has concluded that the CSRA divests courts of jurisdiction 
to consider challenges under the Administrative Procedure Act to the OPM’s calculation 
of retirement benefits.  See Fornaro v. James, 416 F.3d 63, 66-69 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
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(Roberts, J.).  As that court explained, “[a] series of opinions from the Supreme Court 
and this court make clear that [the CSRA’s] remedial provisions are exclusive, and may 
not be supplemented by the recognition of additional rights to judicial review having their 
sources outside the CSRA.”  Id. at 66.  “In sum,” the court concluded, “so far as review 
of determinations under the CSRA is concerned, what you get under the CSRA is what 
you get.”  Id. at 67.   
The District Court properly relied on these principles in concluding that the CSRA 
precludes Lampon-Paz’s FTCA claim in this case.  Lampon-Paz raises essentially four 
arguments to the contrary.  First, he argues that the CSRA does not preclude his claim 
because he is challenging, not the OPM’s ultimate calculation of his benefits, but its 
failure to arrive at that calculation sooner.  The fact remains, however, that Lampon-Paz 
is challenging the OPM’s administration and payment of his benefits, which fall squarely 
within the CSRA.  It may be that the CSRA does not provide a full remedy for any 
damages suffered as a result of a delay in making full payments.2  As explained above, 
however, the CSRA precludes courts from providing supplemental remedies for claims 
arising under the CSRA.  That is true even if the CSRA itself does not provide complete 
relief.  See Fausto, 484 U.S. at 455; Mahtesian, 406 F.3d at 1134; Rollins, 937 F.2d at 
                                              
2 At the Clerk’s direction, the OPM filed a supplemental brief addressing whether there is 
a remedy for Lampon-Paz’s alleged injuries under the CSRA.  The OPM argues that 
there is not.  Cf. Lichtman v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 835 F.2d 1427, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 
1988) (holding that “there is no provision in law for accrual of interest when payment of 
annuity benefits is delayed”) (quotation marks omitted).  We need not resolve that issue. 
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139-40; cf. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425 (1988) (declining to supplement the 
Social Security Act by implying a cause of action for consequential damages even though 
the Act did not provide “a remedy in damages for . . . hardships suffered because of 
delays in [plaintiffs’] receipt of Social Security benefits”). 
 Second, Lampon-Paz argues that his claim is supported by Stephenson v. Office of 
Personnel Management, 705 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2013).  In that case, the court held that 
the OPM may not offset disability retirement annuity payments for Social Security 
benefits that the claimant had stopped receiving.  See id. at 1324, 1331.  It appears that 
Stephenson and related litigation are what led the OPM to stop offsetting Lampon-Paz’s 
payments.  Stephenson, however, does not hold that beneficiaries have a cause of action 
against the OPM for offsetting their payments.  To the contrary, Stephenson itself was a 
case in which the beneficiary sought review under the CSRA from the OPM, from the 
Merits System Protection Board, and then from the Federal Circuit.  See id. at 1325-26.  
Lampon-Paz has raised nothing suggesting that he could not have done the same. 
 Third, Lampon-Paz argues that the District Court already decided this issue in his 
favor by dismissing his first suit for lack of FTCA exhaustion instead of invoking the 
CSRA.  There was some discussion of the CSRA in Lampon-Paz’s first suit,3 but the 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
3 The District Court directed the OPM to file a supplemental brief addressing “whether, 
technicalities aside, there is an avenue for determination of whether plaintiff has received 
the annuity benefits he is owed.”  (D.N.J. Civ. No. 2-15-cv-05835, ECF No. 34.)  The 
OPM responded that the CSRA provides Lampon-Paz with the mechanism for review 
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District Court did not address whether the CSRA required dismissal.  The District Court’s 
dismissal for lack of exhaustion instead had no bearing on that issue because “a federal 
court has leeway to choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on 
the merits.”  Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysian Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 
(2007) (quotation marks omitted).  That is just what the District Court did.  
Finally, Lampon-Paz argues that the absence of a remedy in this situation would 
permit the OPM to intentionally withhold his payments whenever it wants and for as long 
as it likes.  This case does not present that scenario.  Lampon-Paz alleges merely that the 
OPM committed unspecified negligence by partially offsetting his payments for one year 
before retroactively paying him the full amount.  We thus do not consider whether any 
other set of allegations might permit mandamus or any other relief.  Cf. Hinkel v. 
England, 349 F.3d 162, 165 (3d Cir. 2003) (addressing mandamus and the CSRA). 
III. 
  For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  Lampon-
Paz’s motions to amend and supplement his briefs are granted, and we have considered 
his amendments and supplements in reaching our decision.  All of his other motions are 
denied.  The OPM’s motion to file a supplemental appendix is granted except to the 
extent that the OPM seeks to expand the record on appeal.  
                                                                                                                                                  
described above, but the OPM did not seek dismissal for that reason at that time. 
